Forum:	Security Council
Issue:	Strengthening the Partnership between the UN and the African Union on the Issues of Peace and Security in Africa
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I. Introduction

In recent decades, Africa has become recognized not just for its wealth of natural resources and cultural variety, but also as a challenging battleground for power struggles, regional instability, and longstanding historical inequalities. The crises across the continent, ranging from the charred remnants of Libya's civil conflict to the dire humanitarian situation in Tigray and the increasing urban violence in Khartoum, are anything but isolated.[1] They represent indicators of deep-rooted vulnerabilities, foreign intervention, and lasting effects of post-colonial legacies. Despite the proliferation of peacebuilding efforts and international interventions, the outcomes frequently fail to achieve lasting security or true reconciliation. This situation highlights an essential requirement: increased collaboration that is more coordinated, equitable, and sustainable between the United Nations (UN) and the African Union (AU).[2]

Although both organizations have committed to shared responsibilities in conflict resolution, the practical execution reveals gaps in capacity, alignment, and political leverage. The Libyan crisis exposed the vulnerability of AU diplomacy to foreign influence, with regional rivalries and NATO actions surpassing solutions initiated by African contributors. It is evident from these interconnected and overlapping crises that addressing security in Africa requires a tailored approach rather than a universal solution. Nor can it be effectively resolved by the UN on its own nor by AU institutions functioning independently. This involves not only sharing resources and intelligence but also confronting discomforting questions concerning sovereignty, accountability, and the real motivations of external actors. Enhancing this collaboration goes beyond being a strategic requirement, it also is an ethical obligation, as these failures extend beyond Africa's physical borders.[3]

When millions of people are displaced, when hunger becomes a weapon, and when teenage girls are abducted for going to school[4], the failures are not just African. They are international. They speak to a fractured global order that demands a rethink of how peace is built — and who gets to build it.

[1] Dutta, Prabhash K. "Has Africa Become a Battleground for the New Cold War? It's China vs America in Mother Continent." *Firstpost*, 21 Aug. 2024, www.firstpost.com/world/has-africa-become-a-battleground-for-the-new-cold-war-its-china-vs-america-in-mother-continent-13806603.html.
[2] Schmidt, Annie. "The United Nations–African Union Partnership and the Protection of Civilians - International Peace Institute." *International Peace Institute*, 12 Mar. 2025, www.ipinst.org/2025/03/the-united-nations-african-union-partnership-and-the-protection-of-civilians.
[3] Shupak, Gregory . "Media Completely Ignores NATO War Role in Libya Chaos | Responsible Statecraft." *Responsiblestatecraft.org*, 27 Sept. 2023, responsiblestatecraft.org/libya-floods-nato/.
[4] Busari, Stephanie. "They Were Kidnapped from a Boarding School 10 Years Ago. Hear Their Stories." *CNN*, 14 Apr. 2024, edition.cnn.com/2024/04/14/africa/chibok-girls-ten-years-as-equals-intl-cmd/index.html.

II. Definition of Key Terms

A. African Union (AU)

The African Union (AU) is a continental organization established in 2002, being the successor of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), aiming to facilitate peace processes and economic development between African states. It offers membership to all African countries that ratify the Constructive Act of the African Union", which encourages African solidarity, socio-economic integration, promoting peace, as well as fostering democratic principles with good governance. The AU currently consists of 55 member states, of which 3 remain monarchies. Further, the organization enables African countries to unite their voices in the international dialogue similar to the European Union (EU) and its stakeholders. It possesses a Peace and Security Council (PSC) as well as the African Standby Force (ASF), serving as a tool for mediation and peace support operations.[5]

B. Development Aid

In 2023 59.7 million USD were funded to African countries, thereby being the biggest aid recipient continent. Development aids aim to support living standards within communities abroad and are usually donated from MEDCs. These aids can foster programs across sectors, with humanitarian, heath, education, agriculture, or environmental objectives, whilst they all desire to enable more stability in the affected region. Solid aids address root causes of conflict such as poverty, inequality, and weak institutions, which all hinder sustainable growth opportunities for these societies. As financial aids are prone to be one time payments that might not reflect a gradually developing process, technical assistance by means of infrastructure has proven to enable local stakeholders to help themselves in upcoming challenging situations. [6]

C. Multilateral Cooperation

It involves collaboration among different countries and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) on issues of regional or global importance with shared responsibilities. Shared missions, strategic dialogues, and coordinated policy frameworks can promote multilateral cooperation, in order to share burdens and leverage comparative

[5] African Denion. "About the African Union." *Au.int*, African Union, 2019, au.int/en/overview.
[6] Brucker, Maximilian , and Madhinee Valeyatheepillay. "Development Aid – between Illusion and Reality." *IFO-Institut*, 2017, www.ifo.de/DocDL/dice-report-2017-4-brucker_valeyatheepillay-december.pdf.

advantages. The principle of global solidarity has to be recognized when cooperating across diverse communities, as no single actor has sufficient capacity or legitimacy to act alone. [7]

D. Sovereignty

It is the principle that a state has supreme authority over its territory and domestic affairs, free from external interference. In previous centuries, MEDCs tended to intervene in post-colonial Africa under the guise of humanitarian support, while their own interests were also pursued, damaging a possible relationship of trust. Especially in peace discussions, local communities have urged to be integrated in meditative processes as regional stakeholders will have to live with the outcome. Legitimacy and effectiveness of measures and interventions are bound to acceptance among the inflicted community, which requires consent of the host society. Similarly, precedent financing models for infrastructure development have repeatedly raised concerns about the extent to which land grabbing measures function as legitimate compensation or whether it is a matter of commercializing state property to external forces, which weakens the state body.[8]

E. Peacekeeping Operations

These missions are deployed by international organizations to help maintain or restore peace in regions experiencing conflict. It may include military, police, and civilian components and often focus on ceasefire monitoring, civilian protection, and support for political transitions. The African continent has seen 13 different UN peacekeeping operations let alone since 2000, making it the top continent. Territorial and religious conflicts in particular repeatedly cause friction between social classes, with rural areas in conflict countries often subject to anarchist regulation by gangs.[9] On the other hand, African countries also contribute a great deal to UN missions, with 11 African countries listed among the top contributors to UN peacekeepers, whereby this is a foreign policy priority for many wealthier African countries. Peacekeepers own the ability to protect civilians, although their work heavily depends on cooperation and willingness of the parties involved.[10]

F. Mandate Authorization

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[7] Brozus, Lars , and Naomi Shulman. "The G7 Should Focus on Inclusive, Selective and Anticipatory Policy Approaches." *German Institute for International and Security Affairs*, 17 Aug. 2022, www.swp-berlin.org/publications/products/comments/2022C47_MultilateralCooperation.pdf, https://doi.org/10.18449/2022C47.

[8] "What Is Sovereignty?" *CFR Education from the Council on Foreign Relations*, Council on Foreign Relations, 28 Apr. 2023, education.cfr.org/learn/video/what-sovereignty.

[9] Feingold, Spencer, and World Economic Forum. "Who Are the Blue Helmets? UN Peacekeeping, Explained." *World Economic Forum*, 21 Sept. 2022, www.weforum.org/stories/2022/09/who-are-the-blue-helmets-un-peacekeeping-explained/.

[10] Klobucista, Claire, and Mariel Ferragamo. "The Role of Peacekeeping in Africa." *Council on Foreign Relations*, 12 Dec. 2023, www.cfr.org/backgrounder/role-peacekeeping-africa.

It refers to the formal granted legislative ability a political body owns. The UN Security Council can sanction states and organizations, condemn actions of pernicious actors, push for legal jurisdiction and conviction, establish peace operations, and legitimize military intervention. As mandates are often attributed after lengthy negotiations, they are more likely to receive greater acceptances among all stakeholders, whilst also ensuring an objective, non-bias approach to the matter. Especially in a diplomacy-led world, in which many different organizations hold various security councils and peace forces, it is important that only those who have the legal authority can issue mandates, and that they are recognized by the people concerned as such a legitimate body, all of which prevents the feeling of arbitrariness.[11]

III. General Overview

A. Peacebuilding on the African Continent

Despite the end of colonial rule, sentiments from the time of oppression continue to prevail in many places, which are reflected in an unstable society and thus fuel conflict. The UN is committed to negotiating deep-rooted tensions in order to protect the safety of the civilian population.

1. Regime inflicted Conflicts

a. Libyan Civil War (2011 - 2020)

The Civil War in Libya was also part of the Arab Spring. Many opposed the Gaddafi government for its tyrannical rule and the government split. A national transitional council was set up, but Gaddafi did not accept this, and military conflicts broke out between the NATO-supported democratic forces in the country and the overthrown government and its army, creating a power vacuum within politics.[12] The UN puts the number of people in need of aid in Libya at 900,000.[13] The complex fragmentation within the revolutionary groups resulted in a failed creation of a lasting executive. Civilians often experienced arbitrary detention, displacement, and airstrikes, particularly in urban areas like Tripoli and Benghazi. The two main forces involved in forming a state, the "Government of National Accord

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[11] Hellmüller, Sara, et al. "What Is in a Mandate? Introducing the UN Peace Mission Mandates Dataset." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 68, no. 1, 2 Mar. 2023, p. 002200272311598, https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231159830.
[12] Milne, Seumas. "If the Libyan War Was about Saving Lives, It Was a Catastrophic Failure | Seumas Milne." *The Guardian*, Guardian News and Media, 26 Oct. 2011, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/oct/26/libya-war-saving-lives-catastrophic-failure.
[13] Nielsen, Nikolaj. "'No Progress in Years' in Libya, Says Un Migration Body." *EUobserver*, 24 May 2022, https://euobserver.com/migration/155049.

(GNA)" and the eastern-based "Libyan National Army (LNA)" , agreed on a ceasefire in 2020, which remains unstable to this day.[14] The AU and UN both struggle to mediate lasting peace due to entrenched local rivalries and external interference from foreign state actors that aim for more influence in the region.

b. Tigray Conflict Ethiopia (2020 - 2022)

Ethiopia is officially a federal parliamentary republic, although numerous liberalizations have been observed in recent years. Whilst Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed put an end to long-running conflicts with neighbouring Eritrea, his government system has become more centralized. In 2019, he created the "Prosperity Party", whereby numerous parties and local ethnic associations dissolved into this party. The Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), a former ruling party based in the border region with Ethiopia, refused to participate in this consolidation. In particular, federalism was to be restructured under Ahmed and thus fewer powers given to the regions, which the TPLF did not agree with. Following the Covid 19 pandemic and deterioration led to a postponement of the parliamentary elections, while the TBLF called its own elections in the Tigray region, which it won by 98.2%, to which the federal government deemed those elections illegal.[15]

Further tensions between TBLF regional executive forces and the federal government led to an armed conflict between the parties. Government forces, alongside allied troops from the Amhara region and neighboring Eritrea, were accused of committing widespread human rights abuses, including mass killings, sexual violence, and the deliberate blockade of humanitarian aid. Civilians bore the brunt of the violence, with millions displaced and facing famine-like conditions due to restricted access to food and healthcare. The use of state power against a regional population illustrates the challenges of balancing sovereignty with human security in fragile multi-ethnic states. In November 2022, AU peace initiatives achieved a cessation of hostilities between TBLF and the government, ending the

[14] Haraschta, Philipp. *Strengthening Peace by Including Refugees of War in Society*. BERMUN, Oct. 2022, docs.google.com/document/d/1sApZmEu5KcNas5Lvzj5zHpK8iyP9t2YN0kBGZ8S-Ayg/?tab=t.0.
[15] Imran, Zainab. "Ethiopia's Tigray War: Background and State of Play." *Modern Diplomacy*, 5 July 2023, moderndiplomacy.eu/2023/07/05/ethiopias-tigray-war-background-and-state-of-play/.

armed conflict; however, Eritrea is not part of this agreement and still occupies large parts of Tigray today. The war was characterized by human rights violations, with rape in particular being frequently documented and carried out with particular severity in front of family members.[16]

c. Sudan Conflict – SAF vs. RSF (since 2023)

Sudan is historically characterized by instability, having seen 20 coups since its independence in 1956. It is usually ruled by military governments, whereby democratic movements have mostly been crushed or have become fragmented. Within the current government, a split has occurred, with the parts of the military controlling regions autonomously in paramilitary associations. In 2019, the three-decade ruling President Omar al-Bashir was overthrown by the military, consisting of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), in the wake of public democratization efforts. In the months that followed, a military junta was installed and civilian protests were brutally suppressed, resulting in several killings and rapes. After appeasement by the AU, a council was established, which was to be democratically legitimized, which was once again overthrown by the military in 2021 resulting in a newly constituted military junta. After the controversial restoration of former Islamist officials, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) withdrew from the SAF as they did not want to subject themselves to the dominance of Khartoum's traditional elite over Sudanese politics and recruited members across Sudan, which led to massive tensions. The conflict, rooted in competing power structures and differing visions for military integration, quickly descended into urban warfare, particularly in Khartoum and Darfur. Civilians have been the primary victims, suffering from indiscriminate shelling, looting, and mass displacement. The state's fragmentation and the use of formal and paramilitary institutions to pursue power demonstrate the dangers of weak transitional governance and militarized politics. Efforts by the AU have struggled to gain traction amid ongoing hostilities and humanitarian crisis.[17]

2. Terrorism

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[16] "Tigray Rebels Killed Dozens of Civilians: Ethiopia Rights Body." *Al Jazeera*, 13 Nov. 2021, www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/13/tigray-rebels-killed-scores-of-civilians-ethiopia-rights-body.

[17] Ali, Ali Mahmoud, et al. "Two Years of War in Sudan: How the SAF Is Gaining the Upper Hand." *ACLED*, 15 Apr. 2025, acleddata.com/2025/04/15/two-years-of-war-in-sudan-how-the-saf-is-gaining-the-upper-hand/.

a. Boko Haram

Boko Haram is a Sunni terrorist organization originating from the Kanuri people, which operates in the province of Borno in western Nigeria and the neighbouring countries of Niger, Chad and Cameroon. Based on Salafism, it strives for a return to the ultra-conservative values of Islam, with the introduction of Sharia law and a ban on Western education and its interpretation. The group is linked to many Islamist terrorist militias in other parts of the world, such as the Taliban or the Islamic State (IS). The philosophy of Boko Haram is contrary to the democratic rule of law. Boko Haram was one of the first militias to prove that they express their demands through brutal violence to the detriment of the civilian population. Boko Haram was the first terrorist group in Nigeria to carry out suicide attacks, they attacked the UN office in Abuja in 2011 and abducted citizens of Western countries.[18] In the operating region of Borno, 30% of private homes and large parts of the infrastructure have been destroyed, displacing around two million people.[19]

Nigeria, Niger and Chad joined forces as early as 1998 in a Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), which was originally intended to fight gang crime in the border region, but has prevented terrorism from spreading further since 2012 through a mandate expansion, although it has not been able to liberate the Borno region. According to observers, the MNJTF is poorly equipped and corruptible, causing the fight against Boko Haram in its area of origin to fail repeatedly. Amnesty International also reports atrocities committed against detainees in the military, with some being left to die of their battle wounds or starved to death in prison. In addition, hasty action is often taken with the bare suspicion of Boko Haram association resulting in being shot, while reports have indicated that bearded men are already considered suspicious.[20]

b. Anarchy in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

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[18] "Abuja Attack: Car Bomb Hits Nigeria UN Building." *BBC News*, 26 Aug. 2011, www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14677957.
[19] "Letter from Africa: How to Rebuild Nigeria after Boko Haram." *BBC News*, 10 May 2016, www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-36191512.
[20] Hoinathy , Remadji, and Raoul Sumo Tayo . "Decades of Security Cooperation under Threat in Lake Chad Basin | ISS Africa." *ISS Africa*, 27 Jan. 2025, issafrica.org/iss-today/decades-of-security-cooperation-under-threat-in-lake-chad-basin.

The DR Congo is in a process of transition to a democratic and constitutional system and has been struggling with the consequences of a disrupted society since the Belgian colonial withdrawal. Its eastern regions descend into near-anarchy due to the presence of numerous armed groups, including the March 23 Movement (M23) and factions linked to the Islamic State (IS). The resurgence of M23 in 2022, a rebel group primarily composed of Tutsi fighters backed by the Rwandan government, has intensified violence in North Kivu, leading to widespread displacement and civilian casualties. At the same time, IS-affiliated militants, particularly the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), have carried out terror attacks targeting villages, churches, and refugee camps. The east of the country is witnessing repeated armed confrontations between Congolese security forces and various rebel groups. These groups are fighting for political influence, land rights and access to raw materials. According to the United Nations, more than six million people are displaced within the DR Congo. Rebellious groups remain powerful in regions that state actors have little to no control over.[21]

c. **Sahel Crisis**

Since the Arab Spring in 2011, parts of the Sahel region have been confronted with growing crime and the brutal actions of roving gangs. Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso are facing attacks by Al-Qaeda aligned terrorist groups, starting with the independence aspirations of the unrecognized Asawad state between Algeria and these three Sahelian countries. The insecurity caused by Boko Haram in the region motivated the Islamist Tuareg, ethnic Berbers, to conquer parts of Mali in 2012. Intervention by the French, Mali's former colonial power, pushed the terrorists back to the north, continuing to affect Niger and Burkina Faso. The region has become a hotspot for jihadist violence from the Macina Liberation Front as well as the Islamic State of the Greater Sahara, resulting in a disastrous humanitarian crisis with 4.2 million displaced people.[22] Regional military responses, including international interventions such as France's Operation Barkhane

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[21] Mureithi, Carlos, and Eromo Egbejule. *Who Are the M23 Rebels and Why Is There Fighting in Eastern DRC?* The Guardian, 27 Jan. 2025, www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jan/27/who-are-m23-rebels-fighting-in-eastern-drc-congo.

[22] Peyton, Nellie. "Violence Affects More People than Ever before in Africa's Sahel." *Reuters*, 27 June 2019, www.reuters.com/article/world/violence-affects-more-people-than-ever-before-in-africas-sahel-idUSKCN1TS2EI/.

and UN peacekeeping missions, have faced limitations amid rising anti-foreign sentiment. After the French responded to terrorist actions with brutality and committed mistakes, such as the French Air Force mistaking a wedding for a terrorist convention as well as another coup of the Mali government through its own military, cooperation deteriorated. Following the new government's decision to suspend democratic elections until further notice, France decided to withdraw its troops in 2022 after 9 years on-site. The situation remains precarious, with terrorist gangs in the north of the country ruling effectively autonomously and despotic.[23]

B. Supporting the Reconciliation of Social Disparities

The stability of a country is also characterized by its economic strength, as well as its ability to navigate through hardships while continuing to adequately supply the population. LEDCs often have to fight harder in economic crises, while in African countries this situation is exacerbated by unfair preconditions due to the colonial past, as a result of which the capital is not dispersed among the population.

1. Economic Partnerships

a. The Situation in Djibouti

Djibouti is a small East African country located between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden and is situated along one of the most important cargo shipping routes. The Suez Canal near Egypt makes it possible to ship goods between South Asia and Europe without having to navigate around the entire African continent. Along this trade route lies Djibouti with a commercial port, which serves as a stopover and is also used as a transshipment point for the vessels.[24] Djibouti is considered a historic commercially poor country, making the port industry with international relevance the most important economic source. Djibouti is also strategically well-placed and is therefore in the interest of many MEDCs to secure the seamless transportation of goods.[25] Five military bases of foreign nations are currently maintained on Djiboutian soil. China, Japan, Italy, France and the

[23] King, Isabelle. "How France Failed Mali: The End of Operation Barkhane." *Harvard International Review*, 30 Jan. 2023, hir.harvard.edu/how-france-failed-mali-the-end-of-operation-barkhane/.
[24] Picheta, Rob. "Why the Suez Canal Is so Important – and Why Its Blockage Could Be so Damaging." *CNN*, 26 Mar. 2021, edition.cnn.com/2021/03/26/africa/suez-canal-importance-explainer-scli-intl.
[25] West, Stuart. "Djibouti, a Port Ecosystem Designed for Global Trade." *African Business*, 3 Apr. 2025, african.business/2025/04/long-reads/djibouti-a-port-ecosystem-designed-for-global-trade.

USA each maintain a military facility to support their fleets in the Red Sea. Djibouti accepts this in order to protect its economic resources and is now also permitting Saudi Arabia to set up a base, although it often remains questionable to what extent this sell-out can be in Djibouti's interests other than purely economic ones. The proximity of the bases to each other is critical to security, a situation that can escalate in polarizing circumstances on the shoulders of Djibouti.[26]

b. Trade Flows

As of 2024, Africa's total trade volume reached approximately $1.2 trillion, with most exports in the resource sector, such as oil, minerals, and agricultural products. China has emerged as a significant trading partner, particularly in the mining sector; for instance, the Democratic Republic of Congo's refined copper exports to China surged by 71% to 1.48 million metric tons in 2024 . Despite the implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), intra-African trade remains low, accounting for only 16% of the continent's total trade.[27] The ongoing limitation of regional trade underscores a continuous lack of cross-country business development. Moreover, around 50% of Africa's trade is bound to just five non-African economies, highlighting a reliance on external markets and establishing a dependency.[28]

c. Supply Chains

The global economy is reliant on supply chains, most of which have led to the extraction of resources, production, material processing being located across different countries.[29] The prevalence of local supply chains, where all production and distribution activities occur within a single country or region, has diminished due to the advantages globalization offers to both retailers and consumers. Currently, the economies of most nations are heavily dependent on global supply chains, leading countries to find a niche, specializing in a certain sector. While this cannot be entirely generalized, many LEDCs do so in material extraction, developing nations in production

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[26] Okewoye, Sean. "Why Is Djibouti, the Tiny African Nation, Hosting the World's Superpower Military Bases?" *Diplomatic Watch*, 26 Jan. 2025, diplomaticwatch.com/djibouti-military-bases-strategic-importance/.

[27] Mene, Wamkele. "Intra-African Trade and Its Potential to Accelerate Progress toward the SDGs." *Brookings*, 29 Jan. 2025, www.brookings.edu/articles/intra-african-trade-and-its-potential-to-accelerate-progress-toward-the-sdgs/.

[28] Odjo, Sunday, and Fousseini Traoré. *Africa Agriculture Trade Monitor 2024*. Intl Food Policy Res Inst, 3 Sept. 2024.

[29] CIPS. "Global Supply Chains." *Cips.org*, 2022.

and MEDCs in the distribution of goods. Producing nations are often low-wage countries, leading many companies from industrialized nations to outsource production into low-wage developing nations.[30] Many countries in Central Africa are currently still at a preliminary stage to a manufacturing industry and are more interesting for businesses due to the extraction of raw materials, which still incorporates them into this chain and places them at the very beginning.[31]

2. Wealth Disparities

a. The Situation in Nigeria

Despite being Africa's largest economy, approximately 63% of Nigerians live below the poverty line, with over 112 million people affected. The situation is exacerbated by an inflation rate that has risen to 34.6% in 2024, the highest in 28 years, leading to a significant increase in the cost of living, affecting daily habits. Food insecurity links to this issue, with 25 million Nigerians facing acute food shortages. These economic hardships have led to tragic incidents, such as stampedes at charity events resulting in numerous deaths. However, wealth is present in Nigerian society, mostly among a small elite, with the richest 1% of Nigerians collectively holding 25.5% of the national wealth, mostly stemming from inheritance, monopolies, or crony connections.[32] The government's attempts to stabilize the economy, including a ₦2 trillion stimulus plan, have yet to yield substantial improvements. The situation is particularly grave in the north, where inadequate living conditions due to infrastructure failure have been neglected for decades. Institutional corruption in many areas of state administration and regulation also contribute to this, whereby investigations have shown that 99% of the richest do not pay their standard tax rates, also triggered by a lack of transparency in tax collection.[33]

b. Poverty as a Result of Dependency Mechanisms

A globalized world with a collective society also experiences dangers and crises together. The effects of armed conflicts, climate change or natural

[30] Yuen, Josephina, and Cosima Höer. *Fighting Poverty amid International Exploitation*. PRIMUN, Dec. 2024.
[31] KPMG. *Sector Report Manufacturing in Africa*. 2014.
[32] *Taxing Nigerian Fair Tax Monitor Thematic Report the Rich*. 2024.
[33] Osarenkhoe, Maxwell . "Social Bomb in Nigeria: 99% of the Wealthiest Evade or Avoid Paying Tax While Millions Go Hungry | Oxfam in Africa."
Oxfam in Africa, 15 Oct. 2024, africa.oxfam.org/latest/press-release/social-bomb-nigeria-99-wealthiest-evade-or-avoid-paying-tax-while-millions-go.

catastrophes on economic structures can be witnessed far beyond the region of origin. Also if the economies depend on a single or a limited number of resources, it makes them liable to market fluctuation, which can exaggerate or sustain poverty.[34]

The resource curse, recognized as the paradox of plenty, represents a counterintuitive situation where countries that are rich in natural resources, like oil or minerals, have less economic growth and are less economically developed than countries who have fewer natural resources. It is the failure of many resource-rich countries to benefit fully from their natural resource wealth, and for governments in these countries to respond effectively to public welfare needs.[35][36] Currently it becomes evident in Angola, one of the most oil-dependent nations in Africa, where it makes up 95% of total exports and 28.9% of the GDP. However, different kinds of poverty affected 54% of Angolan inhabitants on average in 2023. Countries may become indebted or reliant on foreign aid as a result of this growing poverty.[37]

However, international aid must also be targeted and meaningful. Governments must learn to properly assess the economic needs of their populations in order to use commercial aid in a lasting manner. Pure fiscal enrichment does not allow societies to position themselves in a liberalized and competitive manner; it drives them into a dependency on monetary injections.[38]

3. Resource Integrity

a. Neocolonial Influences in African Ore Mines

Neocolonialism is the practice in which MEDCs indirectly control or influence LEDCs through economic, political, or cultural pressures, rather than direct military or political rule, often exploiting resources and shaping policies to benefit former colonial powers or global elites. The mines in

[34] Manuel, Isidro Luna,Victor. *The Persistence of Poverty in Capitalist Countries*. Vol. 400, 2016, pp. 67–82, www.elsevier.es/esrevistaeconomiainforma114articulothepersistencepovertyincapitalistS0185084916300330, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecin.2016.09.005.

[35] NRGI. *The Resource Curse: The Political and Economic Challenges of Natural Resource Wealth*. Mar. 2015.

[36] Haraschta, Philipp. "Promoting Sustainable Communities amid Resource Scarcity Conflicts." *BERMUN*, Aug. 2024, docs.google.com/document/d/1VsTFDba2L3neavy-OBzV49tiQaY7rgnjqtrdo5PD4pw/?tab=t.0.

[37] GTAI. *Länderstrategie Angola 2024-2029*. GTAI, 18 July 2024, www.gtai.de/resource/blob/1803198/988f6e67bf9461571b2773eca61d1d86/PRO202407171803192.pdf.

[38] Combes, Jean-Louis, et al. "What Does Aid Do to Fiscal Policy? New Evidence." *IMF Working Papers*, vol. 16, no. 112, 2016, p. 1, https://doi.org/10.5089/9781484382691.001.

Africa's resource-rich soils have a history of exploitation and forced labor. During their reign, colonial powers enslaved numerous inhabitants and sent them into this labor-intensive industry to process the raw materials for European profit.[39] After the countries gained sovereignty, the mines were mostly placed under state administration. Falling demand on the commodities market and often deficits in management and maintenance resulted in a lack of profitable extraction. However, since the 1990s, demand for raw materials for the production of electronic devices, such as cobalt, has increased. As a result of the previous lack of revenues, many African countries were unable to effectively mine these valuable materials, which led to loans being taken out with external issuers, attracting external investors. After the World Bank invested billions in African mines, the push towards complete privatization was often unavoidable. Furthermore, African countries were encouraged to make greater use of tax cuts in order to generate greater attractiveness and thus facilitate foreign direct investments. The sell-off of resources coupled with the tax reductions led to a practical disposal of value bonds, leaving many countries with lower ownership.[40]

Access to Africa's rare earth resources is vital to the economies of major geopolitical rivals including the US, China, and the EU. Observers worry that this competition would push these countries to put control of Africa's mining sector before human rights, safety, and Africans' economic prosperity. For instance, the majority of the mines in the Democratic Republic of the Congo are owned by China, while Child labor, extremely low salaries, withholding of pay, and even violence against workers are among the numerous reports of human rights breaches in these mines. Further, ecological concerns are raised by mining as well, besides damaging trees and the environment, mining frequently poses harmful risks to the human respiratory system, and may cause illness.[41]

[39] Plarier, Antonin. "Mines and the Environment in the Colonial Context." *Encyclopédie d'Histoire Numérique de L'Europe*, 2025, ehne.fr/en/encyclopedia/themes/ecology-and-environment/environment-and-colonial-empires/mines-and-environment-in-colonial-context.
[40] "Natural Resource Mining in Africa." *Nationalgeographic.org*, 2025, education.nationalgeographic.org/resource/natural-resource-mining-in-africa/.
[41] Tom, Amani Matabaro . "China's Illegal Mining Operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo." *Harvard.edu*, 17 Mar. 2025, www.hks.harvard.edu/centers/carr-ryan/publications/chinas-illegal-mining-operations-democratic-republic-congo.

b. Land Grabbing

This method is well established and is being driven in particular by the ongoing privatization of the agricultural sector, whereby countries with a supply deficit seek to bridge this gap by leasing land outside their borders. Primarily agricultural land is preferred, with foreign investors usually acquiring land permanently and enabling economic activities far beyond the usual commercial quantities. Speculation on the international trade markets exacerbates this, as investors make profits by buying and selling land outside their country. The fact that local farmers are often not registered in land registries leads to their displacement, as land masses are only estimated and given to large investors, who act in an expansionist manner. This behavior is critical, as the integrity of the mostly affected LEDCs suffers and agricultural land is also reallocated, leading to a critical supply in their own country.[42]

China's benevolent state loans as part of the Road and Belt Initiative are particularly criticized, whereby states that would not be granted credit on the international financial markets due to their low creditworthiness are saddled with an investment. These investments are enforced as hidden loans with leverage, whereby the debtors have little freedom to effectively advance repayment. In addition, generous estimates of economic benefits from those investments are partially not realized and thus lead to a miscalculation of the LEDC, which increases the borrowers' power. Ultimately leading to China taking over this built infrastructure, which in effect transfers influence to China and thus weakens the state structures of these affected LEDCs.[43]

IV. Major Parties Involved

A. UN Office to the African Union (UNOAU)

Established in 2010 by the UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/64/288, it serves as the primary information transmitter between the UN and the AU, tasked with enhancing strategic, operational, and logistical cooperation. UNOAU's mandate includes providing

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[42] Toulemonde, Marie. "Inside the Great African Land Rush." *The Africa Report.com*, 2 Apr. 2021, www.theafricareport.com/77291/inside-the-great-african-land-rush/.

[43] Sunny, Hanna, and Dr. Karamala Areesh Kumar. "China's Debt Trap in Africa: A Comprehensive Analysis - the Geopolitics." *The Geopolitics*, 23 Nov. 2024, thegeopolitics.com/chinas-debt-trap-in-africa-a-comprehensive-analysis/.

political, technical, and operational support to the African Union's Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), particularly in areas such as conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding. UNOAU has facilitated an integration of the African Standby Force with UN peacekeeping frameworks and doctrines, promoting interoperability and shared planning processes.

In 2022, UNOAU linked the coordination on more than 15 peace operations, aligning their mandate with UN priorities, especially concerning the protection of civilians and stabilization efforts. Furthermore, UNOAU has been instrumental in convening joint planning and assessment missions, including the UN-AU-ECOWAS tripartite missions in West Africa, thereby strengthening the economic build-up, while securing human rights protection achievements. Further capacity-building efforts, such as training AU personnel on early warning systems, conflict analysis, and the Women, Peace, and Security agenda aim to encourage resilient structures that last beyond US involvement.

In 2023, UNOAU co-organized over 20 workshops and policy dialogues, contributing to more coherent responses to crises like those in the Sahel, Sudan, and the Great Lakes region, arbitrating between conflict parties before rivalries are escalating into brutal agressions, as well as contributing to a societal discourse.[44]

B. United Nations Peacebuilding Commission (PBC)

Established in 2005, it serves as an intergovernmental advisory body aimed at supporting post-conflict recovery and long-term peacebuilding efforts. Although not a direct implementer of peace operations, the PBC plays a strategic role in aligning international resources with national priorities and in fostering coherence among stakeholders, including the affected African states. Over 60% of the PBC's country-specific engagements involve African countries, reflecting the continent's deep rooted disparities and need for reparation in global peacebuilding efforts. The PBC strengthens the UN-AU partnership by facilitating inclusive dialogue, resource mobilization, and integrated planning that includes AU-led mechanisms, pushing for change from the perspective of those long neglected. [45]

In 2021, the PBC collaborated with the AU Peace and Security Council, ensuring predictable and sustainable financing to support national reconciliation processes, such as

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[44] Yaw Tchie, Andrew, and Lauren Mcgowan. *The United Nations-African Union Partnership and the Protection of Civilians*. Mar. 2025.
[45] Gaston, Erica. "Revisiting the Peacebuilding Commission's "Bridging" and Advisory Role." *United Nations University*, 14 Dec. 2024, unu.edu/cpr/blog-post/revisiting-peacebuilding-commissions-bridging-and-advisory-role.

within the Central African Republic, contributing to the mobilization of over $48 million in support of local peace initiatives. Through its advisory role to the Security Council and ECOSOC, the PBC has helped shape discussions on funding mechanisms such as the UN-assessed contributions for AU peace operations, aligning with the AU's 2020 consensus on shared responsibility. Additionally, the PBC increasingly emphasizes cross-cutting issues such as youth engagement, gender inclusivity, and climate-related security risks, all vital to safeguard achievements in. In collaboration with the AU Youth Envoy, the PBC has integrated these concerns into the national peace strategies, ensuring more sustainable solutions also recognized by generations to come.[46]

C. Regional Economic Communities (REC)

Economic opportunities enhance a multifaceted and resilient society that is bound to an international exchange in the globalized world, therefore the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the East African Community (EAC) are recognized as essential partners of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). RECs are not only economic unions but also increasingly active players in conflict prevention, mediation, and regional peacekeeping. Their knowledge of local exchanges and necessary infrastructure usages allow them to respond swiftly to emerging crises. For instance, ECOWAS has intervened in political crises in The Gambia (2017), Mali (2020–2023), and Guinea-Bissau with mediation and military deployments, including the ECOWAS Standby Force to relinquish illegitimate powers and protect constitutionality. [47]

The partnership between the UN, AU, and RECs is formalized under the principle of subsidiarity, where RECs often serve as first responders, followed by AU and UN engagement that extend a mandate. UNOAU and the UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA) frequently coordinate with RECs for early warning analysis and joint conflict assessments. The UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) has also directly funded programs co-designed with RECs; in 2022, nearly 30% of its $200 million disbursement went to initiatives coordinated with African RECs, especially in the Sahel and Horn of Africa. Despite their growing role, RECs face challenges such as underfunding, coordination difficulties, and political divisions among member states, as to whether their economic

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[46] "5th Annual Consultative Meeting between the PSC and the UN PBC – Amani Africa." *Amaniafrica-Et.org*, 28 Nov. 2022, amaniafrica-et.org/5th-annual-consultative-meeting-between-the-psc-and-the-un-pbc/.
[47] Obiezu, Timothy. "ECOWAS Regional Bloc Activates Counterterror Force." *Voice of America*, 12 Mar. 2025, www.voanews.com/a/ecowas-regional-bloc-activates-counterterror-force/8008619.html.

mandate reaches beyond bare goods security. The UN and AU have jointly initiated capacity-building programs to support RECs, including logistical support, mediation training, and technical assistance in peace operation planning. These efforts are exemplified by the UN-AU-IGAD joint engagement in Sudan and South Sudan, where early mediation efforts laid the groundwork for peace agreements and will further be guided by the RECs that stay in the region.[48]

D. African Development Bank (AfDB)

The AfDB's Ten-Year Strategy set since 2023 explicitly acknowledges peace and security as prerequisites for sustainable development, marking a shift toward greater engagement in fragile and conflict-affected states.[49] In 2022 alone, the AfDB allocated over $2.5 billion to operations in these states, targeting sectors such as education, healthcare, water, and transport—critical for post-conflict recovery and social cohesion. The AfDB collaborates with both the AU and UN through initiatives such as the African Fragility and Resilience Assessment tool and the Multi-Partner Financing Facility for Peace and Resilience, co-funded by the UN Peacebuilding Fund and EU. As most armed conflicts wreck infrastructure and established structures, opportunities sought from within affected communities mostly result in economic hardships, requiring foreign aid. In countries like the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Lake Chad Basin, AfDB-led infrastructure programs are paired with UN-supported reconciliation and livelihood efforts, creating multidimensional responses to conflict impulses.[50] However, unlike conventional aid, development bank aid is generally only indirectly linked to commercial interests and does not involve foreign state actors purchasing government bonds, as the integrity is inherited by a neutral trustee. Notably, the AfDB chairs the African Resilience Forum (ARF), launched in 2021 to mobilize $10 billion over 10 years for conflict-sensitive development, underlining its actual interest for the region. With support from the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), the ARF is securing food stability in fragile regions. By aligning development finance with peacebuilding priorities, the AfDB complements the security-focused efforts of the AU and UN, contributing to a holistic model of peace. Its expanding role in

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[48] "In Hindsight: The Financing of AU-Led Peace Support Operations: What Next?" *Security Council Report*, 1 Dec. 2024, www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2024-12/in-hindsight-the-financing-of-au-led-peace-support-operations-what-next.php.

[49] "African Development Bank Launches New 10-Year Strategy - EMEA." *EMEA*, 10 June 2024, euromed-economists.org/african-development-bank-launches-new-10-year-strategy/#gsc.tab=0.

[50] "African Development Bank and Lake Chad Basin Commission Sign $10 Million Grant Agreement to Revitalize Lake Chad." *African Development Bank Group*, 1 Apr. 2025, www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/press-releases/african-development-bank-and-lake-chad-basin-commission-sign-10-million-grant-agreement-revitalize-lake-chad-82210.

security-related development shows the increasing convergence between economic recovery and peace consolidation, reinforcing the interdependence of stability and development in Africa.[51]

E. Panel of the Wise (PoW)

Settled under Article 11 of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the AU, the Panel consists of five highly respected African personalities selected by the Chairperson of the AU Commission and approved by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. Each member represents one of the five African regions (North, East, South, West, Central) and serves a renewable three-year term. The Panel's primary task is to provide the AU Commission and the Peace and Security Council with advice on potential or ongoing crises, while closely monitoring arising tensions, as well as to mediate in sensitive political contexts where formal interventions may be premature or diplomatically delicate. The PoW has undertaken these quiet diplomacy missions in conflict zones such as Mali, Sudan, and the Central African Republic. And although only an advisory role is ascribed to them, these personalities across ethnicities and religions are mostly well-respected and can also act authentically through their ties to their homelands.[52] The panel also produces thematic reports on issues such as electoral violence, transitional justice, and youth participation in peace processes. In its collaboration with the UN, the PoW engages with the UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA) and the Mediation Support Unit, facilitating joint missions and shared early warning assessments.[53]

V. Timeline of Events

Date	Event
2002	Foundation of the African Union: It succeeded the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to promote greater unity, peace, and socio-economic development across the continent.[54]

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[51] "COP28: African and Mideast Leaders Welcome $10 Billion SAFE Initiative to Tackle Food Security amid Climate Crisis." *African Development Bank Group*, 5 Dec. 2023, www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/press-releases/cop28-african-and-mideast-leaders-welcome-10-billion-safe-initiative-tackle-food-security-amid-climate-crisis-66661.

[52] "Popular Wisdom Could Enhance Panel of the Wise Performance | PSC Report." *ISS Africa*, 9 Oct. 2024, issafrica.org/pscreport/psc-insights/popular-wisdom-could-enhance-panel-of-the-wise-performance.

[53] Ronceray, Martin, et al. *Making Policies Work*. European Centre for Development Policy Management, 2021.

[54] "The African Union." *German Federal Foreign Office*, 2017, www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/regionaleschwerpunkte/afrika/uebersicht-regionalorganisationen-node/afrikanische-union-node.

January 2008	Protocol AU with RECs: The AU confirmed with RECs including ECOWAS, IGAD, and SADC, to coordinate policies in peace, security, gender, and development collectively, aligning with broader AU goals.[55]
2011 - 2020	Libyan Civil War: Influences of the Arab Spring and opposition to Gaddafi's regime led to a prolonged power vacuum, establishing a widespread humanitarian crises, and ongoing instability despite a fragile 2020 ceasefire between rival factions.[56]
April 2017	Joint UN-AU Framework: In New York, the UN and AU adopted a historic Joint Framework, reaffirming their collaboration on peacekeeping, peacebuilding, crisis response, and conflict prevention.[57]
2020 - 2022	Ethiopian Tigray War: Rooting in centralization and anti-liberalization efforts, the tensions escalated into a brutal civil war marked by mass atrocities, displacement, and famine, until a fragile AU-brokered ceasefire in November 2022 halted major hostilities.[58]
September 2023	Nigeria, represented by Vice President Kashim Shettima, formally demanded a permanent seat for Africa on the Security Council during its UNGA statement, citing Africa's contributions to global peace and the need for equitable representation.[59]

VI. Previous & Possible Solutions

A. Current UN Peacekeeping Missions

1. Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)

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[55] "Protocol on Relations between the African Union (Au) and the Regional Economic Communities (Recs)." *African Union*, 27 Jan. 2008, africanlii.org/akn/aa-au/act/protocol/2008/relations_between_au_and_recs/eng@2008-01-27/publication.

[56] "2011 Libya Civil War Fast Facts." *CNN*, 20 Sept. 2013, edition.cnn.com/2013/09/20/world/libya-civil-war-fast-facts.

[57] Shiferaw, Lidet Tadesse . "The AU-UN Peace and Security Partnership: Power and Politics." *European Centre for Development Policy Management*, 2021, ecdpm.org/work/the-au-un-peace-and-security-partnership-power-and-politics.

[58] Carter, Sarah. "Truce in Ethiopia's War with Tigray Rebels Brought Little Relief. Now It Seems to Be Falling Apart." *CBS*, 6 Sept. 2022, www.cbsnews.com/news/ethiopia-war-tigray-truce-falling-apart-humanitarian-crisis/.

[59] Penney, Joe. "Nigeria Claims It Should Get a UN Security Council Permanent Seat." *PassBlue*, 30 Sept. 2024, www.passblue.com/2024/09/30/nigeria-claims-it-should-get-a-un-security-council-permanent-seat/.

Established in 1991 (S/RES/690), MINURSO's mission is to monitor the ceasefire between Morocco and the Polisario Front, a paramilitary force in the Western Sahara, and to facilitate a referendum for the Sahrawi people to choose between independence or integration with Morocco. While being involved with maintaining peace, ensuring compliance with the ceasefire, and providing support for confidence-building measures, MINURSO encountered a prolonged political stalemate surrounding the referendum, the absence of a mutually agreed political resolution. In combination with its limited mandate, notably lacking a human rights monitoring component, the mission fails to address the region's needs sufficiently. Further, the mission faces growing discontent among Sahrawi youth, and its relevance is being questioned due to the lack of diplomatic progress and the UN's limited influence over the conflicting parties.[60]

2. Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA)

Established in 2011 (S/RES/1990), UNISFA is the intention of a response to increased violence in Abyei, a region that is contested between Sudan and South Sudan. The escalation of tensions occurred after South Sudan gained independence, leading to a heightened need for intervention in the area. UNISFA's main concern is to demilitarize the region, monitor border security, and safeguard civilians until a final status for Abyei is determined through diplomatic negotiations. While UNISFA has made significant contributions to reducing open conflict in the region, its effectiveness is hindered by the lack of progress in political agreements between Sudan and South Sudan. Constraints to the mission relate to lacking cooperation opportunities with local governance, identity disparities, and the imposition of operational constraints by both countries. Moreover, the mission faces restricted access and operational limitations, as in the absence of a civilian mandate, which restricts its capacity to address underlying intercommunal tensions and humanitarian challenges in the area.[61]

3. Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)

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[60] Huddleston, R. Joseph . "The High Stakes of Western Sahara | GJIA." *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*, 6 July 2024, gjia.georgetown.edu/2024/07/06/the-rules-based-order-and-the-high-stakes-of-western-sahara/.
[61] Yaw Tchie, Andrew E. , and Fiifi Edu-Afful . "A Forgotten People in an Unstable Region - the Effectiveness of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei Executive Summary | NUPI." *Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt*, 23 Apr. 2024, www.nupi.no/publications/cristin-pub/a-forgotten-people-in-an-unstable-region-the-effectiveness-of-the-united-nations-interim-security-force-for-abyei-executive-summary.

Established in 2011 (S/RES/1996) after South Sudan gained independence, UNMISS initially aimed to assist in the stabilization of state bodies and further civic development. However, as a civil war broke out in 2013, its focus shifted towards the protection of civilians, monitoring human rights, and providing humanitarian aid. UNMISS offered shelter to hundreds of thousands through its Protection of Civilians (PoC) sites and backing peace agreements. Despite its efforts, the mission faces persistent violence, political instability, and the incomplete implementation of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict, leading to continued insecurity. Ethnic divisions, local militias, and limited access due to security concerns of current executive powers further hinder its ability to foster stability in the region. Additionally, growing frustration among displaced populations challenge long-term credibility of the mission as its efficiency remains unclear.[62]

4. **Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA)**

Established in 2014 (S/RES/2149), MINUSCA diligently commits to the protection of civilians, facilitating the peace process, and assisting in the restoration of state authority in the Central African Republic (CAR). The CAR has experienced recurring cycles of violence since 2013, leading the UNSC for MINUSCA's intervention. The mandate involves aiding in disarmament initiatives, demobilization, and reintegration of combatants, as well as providing support for democratic electoral processes and upholding human rights. Despite certain advancements, MINUSCA encounters ongoing armed gang activities, the presence of weak national institutions, and limited infrastructure. Allegations of misconduct by the sent peacekeepers surrounding the treatment of detainees and the limitations of extending state authority beyond the capital, prolonged the mission in achieving rightful stable conditions. Rural areas are deteriorating in security of the individual as resistance from rebel factions lead to their continued authority.[63]

5. **Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)**

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[62] Hunt, Charles. *A Review of UNMISS' Political Strategy in South Sudan*. United Nations University Centre for Policy Research, 2020.
[63] *Prioritizing and Sequencing Peacekeeping Mandates: The Case of MINUSCA O c to B E R 2 0 1 8*. International Peace Institute, Oct. 2018.

Established in 2010 (S/RES/1925) as an extended mandate to previous missions, MONUSCO also serves protection of civilians in central Africa. The mission's main areas of focus include the disarmament of rebel groups in the eastern DRC border region, providing support to the Congolese army, and aiding in the establishment of a functional rule of law. Despite its sizable presence, MONUSCO has encountered criticism regarding its perceived lack of effectiveness in demilitarizing the ongoing violence perpetuated by armed groups such as the M23. Local populations have frequently voiced their discontent through protests directed at the mission, holding it responsible for the inadequacy in ensuring security. As part of a transition plan, the mission is gradually reducing its presence; however, apprehensions persist regarding the DRC's capacity to independently maintain peace and address deeply ingrained governance and security issues.[64] Since January 2024, the mission is supposed to be withdrawn because it is acting ineffectively and the state government no longer wishes to tolerate its useless actions, but since then further mandate extensions have followed as the situation is still considered unstable, so that a withdrawal seems irresponsible.[65]

B. Political Dimensions

1. Expansion of the African Union's Mandates

Under the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), it is crucial to enhance the AU's capacities to respond to evolving threats. The AU's legal and operational authority to intervene in internal conflicts and unconstitutional changes of government could strengthen democratic institutions across the continent. While Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act currently allows intervention in cases of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, it lacks clear procedural mechanisms and funding guarantees, which should be established to sufficiently guarentee stable structures.[66]

Moreover, expanding the AU's jurisdiction to address transnational threats, such as organized crime, would align its mandate with current security dynamics and allow for interoperability. Expanding institutional capacities are essential to

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[64] "UN, Explained: What Happens When a UN Peacekeeping Mission Ends?" *Better World Campaign*, 21 Feb. 2025, betterworldcampaign.org/peace-and-security-issues/what-happens-when-a-un-peacekeeping-mission-ends.
[65] Staude, Linda. "UN-Mission in DR Kongo: Wegen Misserfolgs vorzeitig entlassen." *Tagesschau.de*, 27 Dec. 2023, www.tagesschau.de/ausland/afrika/monusco-kongo-un-abzug-100.html.
[66] Amvane, Gabriel. "Intervention pursuant to Article 4(H) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union without United Nations Security Council Authorisation." *African Human Rights Law Journal*, vol. 15, no. 2, 2015, pp. 282–298, https://doi.org/10.17159/1996-2096/2015/v15n2a3.

serve intergovernmental advisory, such as enhancing the Panel of the Wise's conflict mediation capabilities, increasing civilian staff in the AU Peace Support Operations Division, and creating a dedicated cyber-security unit. A robust partnership between UN institutions and the AU's commitments will foster resilient structures as well as response capacities.

2. Counterterrorism

Groups like Boko Haram, al-Shabaab, and the Islamic State exploit governance vacuums and porous borders, whereby their actions are further fueled with growing ethnic tensions. A possible solution lies in enhancing intelligence-sharing and operational coordination between the AU, RECs, and the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT). Establishing a continent-wide Counterterrorism Fusion Center, supported by the UN and integrated with AU's African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT), may centralize data analysis, risk assessment, and threat forecasting. Furthermore, UN-backed training programs, as in the UNOCT's Regional Counter-Terrorism Programme in East Africa, should be scaled across high-risk zones, prioritizing community-based policing and counter-radicalization.[67] In particular, the anarchist structures must be dismantled, and young people must be given prospects that enable them to lead a fulfilled and at least financially self-sufficient life. Integrating counterterrorism efforts with stabilization and development programs, particularly those led by the African Development Bank, can oppose root causes like youth unemployment and marginalization.[68]

3. Security Council Reform

Africa remains the most discussed region in Security Council discussions, yet it lacks permanent representation, a contradiction that undermines the legitimacy and equity of the international system established by the UN. Nigeria, as Africa's most populous nation, with over 220 million people, and one of the continent's largest economies, has demonstrated consistent commitment to regional peace and security. Since its first deployment of police officers to the UN Mission in the Congo in 1960, Nigeria has participated in 41 UN peacekeeping operations, deploying over

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[67] "Counter-Terrorism in Africa: Open Debate." *Security Council Report*, 20 Jan. 2025, www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2025/01/counter-terrorism-in-africa-open-debate.php.
[68] Williams, Bronwyn. "Apathy, Anarchy, Activism: Three Paths Ahead for Africa." *Issafrica.org*, 18 Mar. 2025, futures.issafrica.org/blog/2025/Apathy-anarchy-activism-three-paths-ahead-for-Africa.

200,000 troops and police officers globally.[69] The concerns of the global South are great and require fair representation, which should be institutionalized. Nigeria is considered a constitutionally stable nation for the region, which has been committed to security through numerous efforts in the region. As a continent with a population of 1.3 billion, Africa clearly deserves a stable representative force that does not alternate every now and then, but can report and participate in decision-making in the long-term.

C. Economic Dimensions

1. Assistance towards Self-Reliance

As development aid in the form of one-off payments usually does not provide adequate long-term relief for the affected areas, many NGOs are now aiming to support self-sufficiency in their work. The AfDB has developed blueprints for transforming economies through agriculture and small-scale industrialization. Investment in local value chains, such as processing agricultural outputs into finished goods, would allow countries to retain more value domestically, increasing resilience to external shocks.[70] Furthermore, peacebuilding funds should be tied to capacity-building projects, such as vocational training for youth in conflict-prone regions and support for women-led cooperatives in fragile states. In 2023, 60% of Africa's youth were either unemployed or underemployed.[71] Investments that target support in job creation would reduce the socioeconomic grievances that fuel instability. Rather than perpetuating cycles of donor dependency, assistance must shift to fostering autonomous, diversified economies that aim to fully meet their populations' needs on their own.

2. Domestic Liberalizations

The accelerated privatization of critical infrastructure has led to an increasing share of foreign investment structures, which has contributed to an expansion of foreign influence. Integrity can be restored by offering opportunities for self-liberalization so that local residents can drive forward investments on their own initiative so that farmers, for example, retain their leases in the long term.[72]

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[69] Agbakwuru, Johnbosco. "Nigeria: UNGA 79 - Nigeria Demands UN Security Council Seat." *AllAfrica.com*, 23 Sept. 2024, allafrica.com/stories/202409230570.html.

[70] Woldemichael, Andinet, et al. *Transforming Africa's Agriculture through Agro-Industrialization*. African Development Bank Group, 2017.

[71] Usman, Shehu, et al. *Transforming Africa's Trade: Migration and Youth Unemployment in Africa: Implications for the African Continental Free Trade Area*. African Export-Import Bank, 2024.

[72] MacFarquhar, Neil . "African Farmers Displaced as Investors Move In." *Biologicaldiversity.org*, New York Times, 21 Dec. 2010, www.biologicaldiversity.org/news/center/articles/2010/new-york-times-12-21-2010.html.

Liberalization must be tailored to enhance regional trade under the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which covers 54 countries and has the potential to enhance intra-African trade by over 50% by 2030. However, unlocking this potential requires removing non-tariff barriers, modernizing customs systems, and expanding digital infrastructure.[73] Governments should liberalize sectors such as energy, telecommunications, and transportation, which are historically dominated by inefficient state monopolies, by offering public-private partnerships (PPPs) that liberate the market from within. Liberalization must also include reforms in financial services to deepen credit access for small and medium enterprises (SMEs), particularly in post-conflict regions.[74] Additionally, fair and transparent procurement policies can reduce corruption and foster investor confidence, which will benefit creditworthiness, which also enables fair loan conditions, so that instead of being financially dependent and at the mercy of arbitrary state banks, the treasury has a choice in competition on the international market.[75]

VII. Conclusion

Africa is a versatile continent with a rich history, a multi-layered society and enormous responsibilities, supported by the desire for intergovernmental cooperation in the form of the African Union. In the past, a pattern of systematic exploitation and alienation of resources can be recognized, whether in colonial times entire ethnic groups were enslaved and their goods confiscated or today privatization displaces the locals. The profit of other countries and economic achievements often took priority over self-determination and the interests of the population. Even today, relics of the colonial era still lead to tensions between different ethnic and religious claims, resulting from the manner of drawing lines in the landscape with a ruler, regardless of traditional migration flows in the region.[76] Deep-rooted conflicts reflect fundamental questions of state legitimacy and require a guarantee of stability, both in the interests of the civilian population and in order to create attractive conditions for an economic future.

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[73] Okpale, Favour. "AfCFTA: African Countries Commit to Increase Intra-Continental Trade to 50% by 2030." *Businessday NG*, 5 June 2024, businessday.ng/news/article/afcfta-african-countries-commit-to-increase-intra-continental-trade-to-50-by-2030/.

[74] "Africa Investment Forum 2024 : Strengthening Public-Private Partnerships Is Key to Financing Infrastructure in Africa." *Africa Investment Forum*, 10 Dec. 2024, www.africainvestmentforum.com/en/news/news/africa-investment-forum-2024-strengthening-public-private-partnerships-key-financing.

[75] "Building Trust by Combating Corruption in Western and Central Africa." *World Bank*, 13 Dec. 2023, www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2023/12/13/building-trust-by-combating-corruption-in-western-and-central-africa.

[76] Gashaw, Tasew. "Colonial Borders in Africa: Improper Design and Its Impact on African Borderland Communities ." *Www.wilsoncenter.org*, 17 Nov. 2017, www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/colonial-borders-in-africa-improper-design-and-its-impact-on-african-borderland-communities.

The African states must manage to discover a competitive foothold in their economic performance, which enables them to advance with their own strength and thus benefit from within, which guarantees economic sovereignty. The benevolent payments of MEDCs as development aid have often been poorly dispensed in the past, leading to a relationship of dependency for the states affected. Aid is important and necessary, especially from former colonialists, if they have enjoyed serious enrichment at the expense of the local population, but this aid should effectively liberalize instead of creating new dependencies.[77] This is aggravated by the attempts of certain initiatives to pressure and commodify the desire for a resilient infrastructure in order to subsequently tie this critical infrastructure to its administration.[78]

Africa deserves to be taken seriously, in dialogue with the crisis regions and as a serious economic partner instead of the often-referenced "Third World".[79] It is a global collective task to ensure basic rights of human existence everywhere, the first step being guaranteed integrity and dignity for the people.

VIII. Questions to Consider

- What political, economic and historical cultural links does your delegation have with African nations and their integrity?

- Does your country or an economic alliance of your country provide development aid to LEDCs in Africa, and if so, what form does this entail?

- To what extent has your country supported UN security efforts in Africa or ECOWAS/AU efforts in the past?

- Are there dependencies in production and supply chains with African countries, and how essential are these for the national supply conditions?

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